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On 9 October 2013, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) signed the declaration, “On the Elimination of Violence 
against Women and Elimination of Violence against Children in ASEAN”, 
which was followed by a Regional Plan of Action (RPA) issued in February 2016. 
The action’s very first step is to “develop ASEAN Guidelines on non-violent 
approaches to the nurture, care, and development of children in all settings” 
(ASEAN, 2017, p. 20). The prevention program is crafted as a framework for 
ASEAN nations to support the implementation of one of the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals which “promises to strive for a better world that 
is just, equitable and inclusive” (ASEAN, 2017, p. 20). Such norms have gained 
urgency as, despite their progress in the development of institutional dem-
ocratic practices as a means to provide security, Southeast Asian nations are 
struggling to counter the cycle of violence. A year before the RPA’s publication, 
for example, the Indonesia Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) expressed 
its concern that the Indonesian government has failed to ensure non-violent 
content even in its high-school education programs, citing an example of a text-
book, “Religious Teaching and Personality”, which justifies Muslims killing the 
“unbeliever” (Susanto, 2015). Another alarming example relates to gender-based 
violence (GBV) with “14 percent of all women between the ages of 15 and 49 
reported being raped” (The Asia Foundation, 2017, p. 3) in Timor-Leste. True 
(2017) finds that GBV in Asia has become a persistent form of violence because 
of its entanglement with “the national or subnational context,” whereby struc-
tural gender inequality is embedded in the “inequality of access to resources or 
to public space and voice, legal discrimination in civil and family status, and 
societal attitudes that condone violence against women” (p. 221).
This conflicting illustration marks a call to investigate the durability of ram-
pant violence in Southeast Asia, where violence has become a mundane reality 
(Arendt, 1970) of everyday life. To view violence as a prolonged and intergener-
ational reality that goes beyond a single disruption or some narrow temporality 
provides another method to observe the cycle of violence and how it emerges 
as a common practice. The normalcy or banality of violence could lead to a 
“crisis of chronicity” (Vigh, 2008), which endorses asymmetrical social relation-
ships, orders, and power, and denies every notion of democratic life (see also 
Arendt, 1970). Against this background, everyday violence hinders the realiza-
tion of ASEAN’s (2017), above-referenced goal to create a “just, equitable and 
inclusive” (p. 20) world. One of the weaknesses in explaining such chronicity 
is, as the expert on security in Southeast Asia, Sidney Jones, observes in the 
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context of Indonesia, that activists, academics, and politicians deliver “time frames [of 
observation which] are too short” (Stange, 2019, p. 270). Responding to the shreds of 
evidence of chronic violence in Southeast Asia, this issue aims to survey how violence 
becomes self-generating or autopoietic. To look at how such mundane violence could 
be addressed, we invited scholars who have been continuously studying the durability 
of violence in their area of regional expertise to contribute to this issue.
The six research articles and one interview article in this issue represent extensive 
discussions of lingering violence in Southeast Asia. Peter Kreuzer’s (2019) study on 
the deadly use of violence by the police in the Philippines shows that although the 
act has taken the spotlight under President Duterte’s war on drugs campaign, it is not 
a new phenomenon since criminal enforcement in the country has a long history of 
extrajudicial (deadly) use of violence by the police. Helle Rydstrom (2019) presents 
a study of chronic violence against women in Vietnam, which has endured for gen-
erations to the point that members of society have begun to consider such abuse 
“normal”. Observing Islamic fundamentalist social media influencers in Indonesia, 
Ario Seto (2019) argues that violent behavior is not simply sparked by discontent but 
is fostered by online and offline sociability of othering and bigotry.
Lúcio Sousa’s (2019) study on the emergence of lia-na’in (master of words) as 
peacemakers in Timor-Leste describes how the state has turned to tradition and 
spirituality to mitigate centuries of violence while sourcing legitimacy to incite secu-
rity and stability. Amporn Marddent’s (2019) work highlights how Muslim women in 
Thailand’s Deep South have become peacemakers, while they nonetheless face the 
challenge of recognition, as, first, their Salafi belief has been stereotyped as being 
inherently violent, and, second, as women’s voices are not considered to be repre-
sentative in a patriarchal society. In the research workshop section, Gunnar Stange, 
Patrick Sakdapolrak, Kwanchit Sasiwongsaroj, and Matthias Kourek (2019) report an 
imbalance in academic research in the field of forced migration studies in Southeast 
Asia that could signify indifference towards how internally displaced populations are 
treated and further victimized in structural violence. The issue, furthermore, features 
an interview by Gunnar Stange (2019) with the Jakarta based political analyst, Sidney 
Jones, on violence, religious extremism, and conflict dynamics in contemporary 
Indonesia. As a long-term observer of Indonesian politics, she warns of the dangers 
of “intolerant above-ground, non-clandestine organizations” (Stange, 2019, p. 270) 
for Indonesian democracy.
Although all the presented cases of violence are rooted in the region’s heteroge-
neous colonial history, the contributors to this issue highlight how contemporary 
violence is augmented and amplified by post-independence socio-political dynamics. 
By doing so, the articles reveal that historically prolonged violence, or what we call 
the durability of rampant violence, is subdued by the dimensions of machinery and 
scale. The machinery could be “actors” (Kreuzer, 2019; Rydstrom, 2019; Seto, 2019; 
Sousa, 2019) or “the autopoietic of violence”, which hinder peace or keep non-violent 
struggles from emerging (Marddent, 2019; Rydstrom, 2019; Sousa, 2019). The articles 
provide a common argument that violence becomes durable because the machinery 
is able to preserve it at different scales and in different arenas: across national and 
subnational geography (Kreuzer, 2019; Marddent, 2019; Seto 2019; Sousa, 2019), in 
private and public sphere (Marddent, 2019; Rydstrom, 2019; Seto, 2019), and in legal 
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and illegal practices (Kreuzer, 2019; Marddent, 2019). In articulating how its machin-
ery and scale operate, this issue discusses violence in four constellations of practices 
and discourses: (1) when violent actors operate beyond the state’s governmentality; 
(2) when violence is framed within an institutionalizing discourse; (3) when vio-
lence functions to delineate, or, on the contrary, strengthen, borders, and legitimizes 
respective claims; and (4) when violence hinders the establishment of non-violent 
discourses. Besides these four constellations, some articles in this issue also advise 
that the media has played a role in influencing both the scale of violence and how vio-
lence is observed. Before we discuss how the machinery and scale of violence operate 
corresponding with these constellations, we will look at the importance and the cur-
rent need for deeper analysis of violence in Southeast Asia in the next section.
NORMALCY AND CHRONICITY OF VIOLENCE
Even democratic states with their established legal arms to steward order are not 
violence-proof. Della Porta’s (1995) rigorous study of social movements in Italy and 
Germany in the 1960s shows that violence is part of a repertoire of political action 
and cannot be isolated to a certain ideology; actors socialized in non-violent environ-
ments can still fall into violence. Violence emerges in expressions that also advocate 
equal rights and peace, including left-wing movements. She contends that 
radical groups took advantage of the available resources in their environment 
to strengthen or reinforce their militancy, their decision to emphasize violence 
can be considered a rational choice. […] But the choice of radicalization was also 
a contingent development, for it depended on the supply of resources available 
to each particular movement’s organization: not surprisingly, the organizations 
that became most violent were those that lacked resources giving them access 
to the system (della Porta, 1995, p. 198). 
She has also recently warned that “the availability (or lack) of material and sym-
bolic resources affects the choice of radical repertoire” (della Porta, 2018, p. 464). 
Her work in connecting violence as radical acts to resource tapping and repertoire 
is helpful in invigorating observations of how violence becomes a durable problem 
and takes place in precipitating events and endures from time to time, including in 
various democratic realities.
The six articles in this issue correspondingly deliver similar observations about 
how the problem of resources and repertoires provides the texture of the violence 
currently enduring in Southeast Asia. However, we would like to extend the thesis. 
We propose that in some conditions, rather than sealing off the emergence of vio-
lence, the opening to democracy and the emerging economic stability have offered 
new arenas of resource tapping and have allowed engineered violent confrontations 
to manifest out of cleavages that were tempered by previous authoritarian rule (e.g., 
Stange & Patock, 2010). In this context, resources play a role not because of their 
scarcity, but because of their availability. The growth of ethnocentric paramilitary 
groups and radical Islamists in Southeast Asia (Hadiz, 2016; Wilson, 2010) are two 
fitting examples of such violence, particularly when violence has become a common 
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repertoire of action, which both the state and non-state actors engage to secure their 
political power as a means to accrue available resources. In this setting, evolving 
violence cannot be confined simply by empowering the state’s agency of policing to 
maintain order, since, in some cases, the state and state actors are part of the com-
peting groups seeking to secure the resource (e.g., Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch, 2019; 
UNHCR, 2018).
The normalcy and chronicity of violence are sustained by the emerging ideol-
ogy of development, through which the state regularly imposes indisputable secu-
rity to maintain order to create political stability. Located between China and India, 
Southeast Asia is home to the world’s fastest-growing economies, such as Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, and Indonesia (OECD, 2019). A consequence of 
such economic development has been the introduction of cultural policies that are 
imagined to ensure national security and productivity, such as Vietnam’s Đổi Mới 
(renovation) policy, Indonesia’s Pembangunan (development) credo, and Thailand’s 
National Culture Act. In these policies, economic development has become a prom-
inent orientation, if not an ideology, for state actors to incite expeditious stability 
rather than creating a laborious public sphere. The cultural program therefore often 
asserts nationalist sentiments and unity as the moral resources of stability and the 
nation’s betterment. This is where violence as a repertoire comes into play, as the 
state enacts strong policing to maintain order. In nonaggressive circumstances, 
power organizes people to internalize certain norms, such as how to be submissive 
to the government in the name of national unity, which is also enforced by the law 
and institutions of justice. Any dissatisfaction, then, is suppressed within normalcy 
or, as Foucault (1978) describes it, “a normalizing society is the historical outcome of 
a technology of power centered on life” (p. 144).
Such developments provide a new opportunity to investigate the ‘old’ violence 
beyond its colonial history (e.g., van Klinken, 2007; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 
2004). We believe that most cases of violence discussed in the articles of this issue 
render a postcolonial problem. However, we would like to add complexity by arguing 
that these nation-states have the agency to come to terms with their colonial pasts, 
practices, and repertoires of violence. Take the Philippines as an example: Boyce 
(1993, p. 131) examines that development strategies crafted during the Marcos era 
were unsustainable and created larger social gaps, such as landlordism as a product 
of problematic land rights, which are prone to armed violence conducted by local 
entrepreneurs. In Indonesia, Suharto’s developmentalist regime imposed a military 
approach to suppress discontent in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor (McGibbon, 2004). 
Investigating the state’s relation and response to durable violence, then, involves a 
deeper view of how these policies influence the local historical contexts and current 
political contestation or discontent. Van Klinken (2007) argues that such examina-
tions not only require continuous observation of political dynamics, but also cultural 
changes. Assessing the communal violence in the Moluccas in the early 2000s, he 
exemplifies that violence and conflicts in the Global South appear to be different than 
their counterparts in the Global North where the presence of the state and policing 
mechanism is more pronounced. Van Klinken (2007, pp. 9-10) warns that violence is 
not simply ideologically driven, but that contesting actors are entangled in “a struggle 
for power in a political system structured along lines of personal relationships rather 
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than formal rules” (p. 136). They are entangled in a historical patron-client loyalty 
rather than emancipatory expression, where they act opportunistically, rely on rum-
ors rather than verified news, and have – to some degree – a relationship with state 
institutions. In such settings, violence becomes a lateral common reality for fostering 
state-building, as violence remains a powerful repertoire, both as the language of 
contestation and as that of the traditional relationships that configure social rela-
tions between actors and interest groups in Southeast Asian countries. Accordingly, 
violence transcends the emergence of the modern state. These actors also under-
stand the notion of crisis differently than those in Western states. As van Klinken 
(2007) describes, “even in the midst of such security crises, many people were still 
conducting politics as usual, albeit in crisis mode and of a kind considered patently 
abnormal in the West” (p. 10).
Veena Das (2004) shares a similar observation in her study on the Indian state and 
extraordinary events, such as periods of communal violence. She finds that although 
violence as an event has ceased, the language of violence transcends the episode into 
the quotidian everyday life, while on the other hand, everyday life encounters provide 
the texture of violence. Das (2004), therefore, calls attention to the normalcy of vio-
lence as a durable reality. The presence of violence in everyday life is not simply a mat-
ter of practice, but also a subject of institutionalization. Based on their research on 
Hindu-Muslim violence and riots in a slum in Mumbai, Chatterji, and Mehta (2007) 
argue that the experience of violence as a “normalcy” is formed through patterns of 
state and institutional governance. This includes, among other practices, establish-
ing government commissions to investigate the riots, the documentation of the riots 
in official narratives, the remaking of slum spaces, crafting redevelopment programs, 
and inviting other non-governmental actors, such as NGOs and civil society organi-
zation, to participate in these processes. With the rising complexity of rehabilitating 
everyday life, members of the community eventually lose their agency, which leads 
to another form of structural violence. While strong administrative states, such as 
those in the Global North, are trained to confine violence, ASEAN states’ historical 
approach to violence appears to be rather one of indifference in the six cases pre-
sented here. Thus, when violence becomes an intergenerational reality, the question 
remains: How do Southeast Asians manage to live with it? 
VIOLENT ACTORS AND THE STATE
The conditions of abnormality and normalcy have been important dimensions 
for discussions of violence since they have been related to how the state, regime, 
or authoritative class governs or controls the population. While modern states are 
expected to regulate the control of law and order, it is never the case that it has the full 
control of order (e.g., Tilly, 2003) and engenders a situation where the state confines 
its power to governmentality or to the authoritative legitimation of control (Foucault, 
1991). Foucault (1991) asserts that, through its government, the administrative state 
takes on a posture of “apparatuses of security” (p. 102), which control social and 
political institutions to establish order and to avoid violence. Yet, the rise of democ-
racy and the administrative state does not eliminate violence. On the other hand, 
Mbembe (2003) and Rojas-Perez (2017) underscore that the reign of governmentality 
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has consolidated power, which shapes “necropolitics” – the use of social and political 
power to dictate how some people may live and how some must die (Mbembe, 2003) 
– where the state dominates individuals’ legitimate decision-making.
In a totalitarian state, the state’s control of its citizens’ lives is utterly decisive, 
whereby those deemed to threaten the state’s policy or ideology will be systemati-
cally incarcerated and their living conditions reduced to “bare life” (Agamben, 2005). 
In other state formations, state control takes shape in the state’s power to cancel a 
person’s citizenship, and, thus, their administrative identity, to marginalize minori-
ties to those deemed to be unfit for the majority, such as LGBTQ+ groups in many 
countries. At large, Bourdieu (1992) contends that, when violence is suspended, the 
relationship between the state and its citizens, or between the ruling class and the 
commons, remains volatile since the latter is organized within a cultural arrange-
ment – “pact of symbolic nonaggression” (p. 145) – or dominated and legitimized by 
the first through “symbolic violence” (pp. 145, 167). 
The contributions to this special issue provide evidence that extend these 
mentioned studies, showing how violence is durable because of its scaling ability to 
transcend the state-citizen boundary through which the actors involved have the 
capacity to operate beyond the state or the state’s legal system. There are some pat-
terns in how this could be observed. The first relates to cases in which the actors 
represent the state, or are part of the state machinery, and obtain the legal justifica-
tion to define the action as the “zone of exception” (Agamben 2003). An exemplary 
case in this regard is Kreuzer’s (2019) article, which depicts how the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) have the authority 
to shoot and kill suspected drug dealers and users as well as other crime suspects. 
Although the state has denounced extrajudicial killings, President Duterte’s drug 
war campaign and the 2016 Davao City bombing created the opportunity for the 
president to issue Proclamation No. 55 and Memorandum Order No. 3 released on 7 
September 2016 on “violence suppression” leading to the legal approval of the use of 
deadly force in cases of suspected crime (Kerrigan, 2017, p. 423). 
The availability of legal sources to prevent, or, on the contrary, to endure violence 
is decisive in shaping the actions of violent actors in the zone of exception. Marddent 
(2019) provides a case where violence endures in Thailand’s Deep South because the 
non-violence values of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, 
which are being practiced by various actors including the state itself, is not accom-
modated in the new security policy. Although the state recognizes the role of UNSCR 
1325 as a guideline to enforce peacebuilding, the military – as an element of the state 
 – seems to be indifferent, upholding its own prescription of security, which centers on 
the use of force and, ultimately, the use of violence as a means of conflict management.
The second pattern of beyondness appears when attempts to counter violence 
are problematic because the actions are considered social practices and the violent 
situation is not recognized as an abnormality. Rydstrom’s (2019) work, for example, 
problematizes how violence against women in Vietnam is a chronic practice that is 
justified by a cultural understanding of men’s “hot temper”, even though the state has 
clearly stated its intent to eradicate the “social evil”. Similarly, Seto (2019) concludes 
that online hate speech and othering messages produced by Indonesian Islamic fun-
damentalists are difficult to counter since the prosecution of religiously justified 
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expressions such as those would be considered “anti-Islam” by the masses. 
One of the consequences of the conditions in which violence could operate beyond 
the state is that the state has lost, to some degree, its legitimacy to govern. With the 
enduring rampant violence and public distrust of the state apparatus in Timor-Leste, 
Sousa (2019) exemplifies that, instead of applying formal legal procedures, customary 
law might help to foster the emergence of a non-violent environment. In such an 
example, the state apparatus does not have the power to follow up the legal case, for 
example against a cattle thief, as his ethnographic description shows. Even when the 
state is present and equipped with institutions to counter violence, violence might 
emerge as unintended consequences beyond its control. The contribution of Stange 
et al. (2019) highlights that, although internal displacement represents by far a larger 
challenge than cross-border displacement in Southeast Asia, scholarly attention in 
the past five years has mainly focused on the latter. Protracted crises as well as reoc-
curring natural disasters in the region, and their oftentimes short-lived repeated 
presence in the media, might just be another example of how structural violence can 
become a “normalcy”.
The cases in this issue do not imply that violent actors are above the law, but prob-
lematize how state action is bounded by normative orders beyond the state’s author-
ity to govern. In this context, although the work of Foucault (1991) and Mbembe 
(2003) are helpful in identifying how the state responds to violence, the contribu-
tions exemplify that there are practices, or enduring mechanisms, such as the public 
acceptance of violence or discrepancy in terms of how victims are treated, that oper-
ate beyond the state. Sousa’s (2019) work in this issue provides a critical case whereby 
the state, incapable of establishing an effective politics of reconciliation, has turned 
to the ritual of the sacred world to achieve legitimacy for its peacebuilding.
VIOLENCE FRAMED WITHIN AN INSTITUTIONALIZING DISCOURSE
The aforementioned enduring mechanism is related to how violence can become an 
everyday life normalcy, if not ritualized. Kreuzer (2019) shows that police officers’ 
deadly use of force in election years seems to decline because they are busy prevent-
ing election violence. Ironically, it is through these elections that politicians who 
support, or are reluctant to end, the use of deadly force are elected. The relationship 
between violence and political cycles also emerges in Sousa’s (2019) work. His case 
shows an example of how, after centuries of violence and obscure frictions between 
political factions, the legal discourse of peacebuilding might disappear from the rep-
ertoire of peacebuilding entirely.  
The difficulty associated with fostering non-violence is, in some cases, the result 
of the embeddedness of violence in the regularizing practice. Rydstrom (2019) 
describes that even Vietnamese women, who are within the same cohort group of 
the victims, do not perceive male violence against women as an anomaly. Rydstrom’s 
(2019) interlocutors explained that physical abuse against women is normalized 
within the male-female cosmology where women are expected to show feminine 
qualities of calm and indulgence to the adversity. Expressing an objection to domes-
tic abuse could lead to a condition where society, even the same gender group, blames 
the victim. In one case, she exemplifies the experience of a victim who is blamed by 
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other women for inciting marital violence, as she had complained about her husband 
and was thereby perceived to have provoked him. Similarly, Seto (2019) shows that 
Islamic-fundamentalist violence in public space is a stick-and-carrot action to solicit 
religious obedience from fellow Muslims, who are rather relaxed in practicing Islam.
In Thailand, Marddent (2019) depicts that bureaucratic complexity has been una-
ble to change the military understanding of security. In this notion of physical and 
armed “security”, peace has been confined to the presence and absence of gunshots, 
instead of order and non-violence. On the other hand, from the perspective of the 
dissidents, the regularizing practice of violence is embedded in the actualization 
of identity, as violence is perceived to be a necessary performance to counter the 
Buddhist central government’s oppressive assimilation policy. 
Scheper-Hughes (2008) suggests that these cycles of violence represent a “contin-
uum of violence”, which denotes the interconnectedness of all forms of violence and 
can also lead to the emergence of “extraordinary violence that is authorized, public, 
visible, and rewarded” (p. 81). In this continuum, the affected societies understand 
the normalcy of violence within a register of institutionalizing discourses: violence is 
placed within rudimentary notions of security (Marddent, 2019), armed encounters 
(Kreuzer, 2019), displacement (Stange et.al, 2019), forces of cosmology (Dương-Âm, 
Yang and Yin in Chinese, Rydstrom, 2019), and within the religious discipline neces-
sary to prevent evil (Seto, 2019).
Accordingly, the emergence of a new order that could establish non-violent val-
ues would first need to contest these discourses. Marddent (2019) exemplifies that 
while the state has failed in securing the ecology of non-violence, grassroots women’s 
movements rely on Salafi discourses to provide applicable methods of peace. Yet, they 
remain at the periphery of peacebuilding efforts since Salafism is generally viewed as 
a violent discourse. Her case is therefore indicative of a stuck-in-the moment episode, 
in which peacebuilding actors struggle to gain recognition of their value in the nego-
tiations. This presents a double-edged problem. First, the common perspective is that 
Islamic communities in Thailand’s Deep South, which includes the peacebuilding 
actors, are the usual suspects in the region’s uprising. The recognition of Salafi actors 
as peacemakers will tarnish this common knowledge and alter the historical record 
that the Thai Muslim community is a violent rebellious group – a political stance 
that is problematic for the Thai government and its military, whose memory glorifies 
the fallen soldiers in the region. Moreover, international NGOs in the region would 
also need to shift their understanding beyond global notions of Salafism as a threat 
to democracy if Salafi actors are to be welcomed into the peacebuilding discourse. 
Second, if Muslim women’s voices are to be included, they would first need to be 
accepted within the patriarchal society. 
An exemplary disruptive method to end the cycle of violence emerges from 
Sousa’s (2019) work in Timor-Leste. Since the nation has been in a constant state 
of violence stemming from 400 years of Portuguese colonialization, 25 years of 
Indonesian occupation, and early-independence civil conflicts, political elites have 
partly delegitimized politicians’ historical accounts and have turned towards rural-
based narratives. In this peacebuilding endeavor, the traditional leader lia na`in plays 
the role as the personification of peacebuilding to deliver an oral history of the young 
nation. In that way, the political elites are also able to present a party that is less 
ASEAS 12(2) | 143
Ario Seto, Gunnar Stange, & Susanne Schröter
entangled with the nation’s violent history. Yet, he posits this new development care-
fully against the background of concerns about whether the lia na`in’s presence in 
state ceremonies has become a performative ritual (spiritual discourse), rather than 
an institutionalization of reconciliation. 
BORDERS AND CLAIMS
The two previous constellations, namely the matters of beyondness and institu-
tionalizing discourse, are related to the borders of social boundaries. As mentioned 
earlier, democratic opening and economic growth are often viewed as factors that 
help to secure development. As economic growth persists regardless of the lingering 
violence, there is no urgency from the state to provide comprehensive non-violent 
solutions to overcome discontent. This problem is well annunciated in the articles 
where violence takes place between those juxtaposed in social boundaries, such as 
the relationship between center and periphery (Marddent, 2019), against a minor-
ity or marginalized group (Marddent, 2019; Rydstrom, 2019), and political groups 
(Kreuzer, 2019; Seto, 2019; Sousa, 2019). In these boundaries, violence takes place 
because a group of actors can initiate claims to denounce the recognition toward 
others. Claims are important to frame the act of violence. Seto’s (2019) article shows 
that declarations of war could be enacted by fundamentalist Muslims upholding 
a physical “jihad” ideology, which is perceived as their operable definition of war 
against fellow citizens who deviate from scriptural religious norms. The insurgen-
cies in Thailand’s Deep South also exemplify similar patterns; while the locals view 
their actions as political expressions of social justice and identity, the center views 
the actions as violent contestations of national integrity. Even in a country where 
its political geography and ethnic diversity are relatively small, such as Timor-Leste, 
violence could emerge among groups with virtual rather than actual distinctions as 
Sousa (2019) exemplifies with the conflicts between East Timorese Westerners and 
East Timorese Easterners. Every state-building project offers an arena for the struggle 
of recognition. Accordingly, any democratic opening provides the affordance for the 
ontological problem of conflict.
Anthony Giddens (1987) examines the nation-state as a “bordered power con-
tainer”, the boundaries of which mark not only administrative provisions but also 
entails the authority to govern power which includes the capacity for waging war, 
extracting resources, policing deviance, maintaining legitimacy, and pacifying the 
state. Such a view of power is, however, a slippery slope since the nation is a top-
down bracket of diversity. Thus, the nation has an enduring tension between identity 
and discontent. In this setting, claims of justified violence are used to enact iden-
tity with which the declaration of conflict or war, as a claim of defending something 
rightful, has become a legal justification rather than an action of total control which 
exerts power as Giddens (1987) had hoped.  
Such conflicts also render the tensions between the center and the periphery. 
This can range from the belief that the central government is failing to recognize 
the periphery’s needs or to ensure the equal distribution of wealth or power, as the 
contributions by Marddent (2019) and Sousa (2019) show. It is often the case that the 
center simply views violence as a problem of identity, rather than of social justice. In 
144 | ASEAS 12(2)
Editorial: Durable Violence in Southeast Asia
such cases, the center only appraises social issues under the guise of whether they 
might hamper economic development. To note, although not discussed in this issue, 
such chronic violence also can be found in Indonesia’s Papua provinces and in the 
case of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Prolonged conflicts preserve contentious politics 
where the conflicts also show how violence can become a currency (e.g., Liow, 2016; 
McCargo, 2014). While the centers urge national stability to create an environment 
conducive to economic development, resistance and liberation movements in the 
periphery view that it is only from severe violence that they can create leverage for 
their demands. The reaction to this is often a military solution that will only increase 
the severity of violence (Marddent, 2019).
When claims of a right to violence cannot be broken, it risks prolonging the act of 
violence in other forms of violence. Kreuzer’s (2019) research finds that the lethality 
levels of police departments’ use of deadly force were evident during the pre-Duterte 
period as well as during his presidency. Yet, through his rhetoric on the war on drugs, 
Duterte has gained a certain political spotlight, which helped him win the cam-
paign (Curato, 2017). From her interviews, Marddent (2019) found that local Malay 
Muslims view armed violence as a “security industry.” This is exemplified in this 
issue’s interview with Sidney Jones (Stange, 2019) and her criticism of the Indonesian 
government’s single-sided development approach to conflict management in Papua, 
which she contends has led to a deep entrenchment of structural violence in the 
region. Such settings provide violent actors with the possibility to control the scale 
and spatiality of violence. The risk, then, is a rollback of the pro-democratic progress 
that can be observed in Southeast Asia in recent years.
At the same time, such processes of accumulation have convoluted the goal of 
enacting violence. Along the course of prolonged violence, actions follow various tra-
jectories and goals are adjusted. In such settings, violence becomes a practice rather 
than deviant behavior, posing the risk of becoming a collective mundane experience 
as previously discussed. This view is an invitation to contest Riches’ (1986) argu-
ment, which laments that violent actors always have choices, as they have chosen the 
conduct for they have calculated that it would be advantageous in dealing with the 
opponent. Emerging nation-states have been pacified by the opening of democracy. 
Yet, there are practices that are retained within their political regularities that pre-
vent the total emergence of a non-violent environment. 
PEACEBUILDING AND ITS DISCOURSES OF ORIGIN
The durability of violence impacts the creation of non-violent initiatives. When 
the state and its legal system displays its weakness in delivering non-violent spaces, 
non-violent spaces might emerge unexpectedly from below as the contributions by 
Rydstrom (2019), Marddent (2019), and Sousa (2019) show. Rydstrom (2019) under-
lines that there is a connection between the effective local movement of “Say No to 
Violence” (Nói Không với Bạo lực) in Vietnam to the larger global initiative of “Say NO 
– UniTE to End Violence against Women” sponsored by the UN. In the case of peace-
building in Thailand’s Deep South, Marddent (2019) depicts that Salafism, as a global 
religious discourse, has played a role in inciting one of the most effective approaches 
to peacebuilding. She acknowledges that Salafi actors have initiated education circles 
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to teach “spiritual healing” in mainstreaming life-security discourses. Spirituality also 
appears in Sousa’s (2019) work. While the Timorese doubt the state’s historical nar-
rative because of its victors’ bias, it turns to the lia-na’in, the guardian of the sacred 
houses in the mountains, as a source of legitimacy in recounting the history of the 
nation, even though the latter hardly appeared as an authority on the national scale 
in the history of Timor-Leste.
These three anthropological works advise that peacebuilding requires a convinc-
ing discourse of origin. In Marddent’s (2019) and Sousa’s (2019) cases, spirituality 
becomes convincing because the people have witnessed that the “rational” govern-
mental approach to violence has not been working for decades. And when it does 
work, it simply delivers the status quo. Marddent’s (2019) interlocutors believe that 
the Islamic notion of patience (sabr) provides a practice that is helpful for ending the 
cycle of violence because it is a practice to find inner peace. In Timor-Leste, lia na`in’s 
blessing is viewed as a spiritual union of the nation and its ancestors and “represents 
a unity between the people and the politicians as the personification of the state in 
the post-conflict nation” (Sousa, 2019 p. 218). In these cases, the spirit overcomes 
political differences. While Malay Muslims in Thailand and the Timorese seek out 
non-violent practices through their cosmologies, Vietnamese women did the oppo-
site as their cosmology normalizes violence against women. In search of security, 
they sourced their narrative from global awareness movements. The effort to end 
violence against women became a convincing public discourse not simply because 
local women had demanded it, but because it found support in massive efforts from 
local organizations and NGOs along with the global #MeToo movement to recognize 
the problem (Rydstrom, 2019).
Different from the previously mentioned discourses of peacebuilding, the work of 
Stange et al. (2019) shows that those who are displaced by natural disasters often only 
gain national, and not international, attention because natural disasters are often 
considered a national problem with the victims ‘only’ internally displaced. By con-
trast, refugees classified as asylum seekers and stateless persons gain more academic 
attention because their mobility concerns at least two states. 
MEDIA
Most of the articles in this issue address the role that media has played in the creation 
of violence and non-violent initiatives. As mentioned earlier, the national awareness 
to end abuse against women in Vietnam has seized on the crucial momentum of the 
#MeToo movement (Rydstrom, 2019). Sousa (2019) also notes that media has a cer-
tain interest in covering official ceremonies, such as with Dada Ikas (withdrawing the 
oath) and Loke Dalan (opening the way), when lia na`in are present. On the contrary, 
Seto (2019) presents a case that digital media becomes a useful scape for Indonesian 
Islamic fundamentalists to encroach on public space and to gain new followers. It 
is exactly because of the circulation of problematic online content, such as bigotry 
and hate speech, that the Islamists could defeat the Christian incumbent in Jakarta’s 
Gubernatorial election, even though the latter was predicted to win.
The outstanding work of Kreuzer (2019) in this issue demonstrates that the role of 
media is not confined to the representation of actors, but as the source of verifiable 
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quantitative data. Since the state does not provide credible data, he mined reports of 
the use of deadly force by police from various news sites. With such a rich data set, he 
imposes that violence should be measured to observe its intensity and its lethality. In 
one of his findings, he exemplifies that “given a large number of armed encounters, 
the absence or extraordinarily low numbers of killed or wounded police-officers, sig-
nals [actually] excessive violence” (Kreuzer, 2019, p. 153).
CONCLUSION
Throughout the articles in this issue, we seek to reconstruct the current contours 
of violence in Southeast Asia. The articles in these issues advise that durable vio-
lence operates through machinery, may that be through the state apparatus (Kreuzer, 
2019; Marddent, 2019), (legal) discourse (Kreuzer, 2019; Marddent, 2019; Stange et al., 
2019), cultural praxis (Rydstrom, 2019), or unresolved frictions of civil groups (Seto, 
2019; Sousa, 2019). These machineries operate in certain constellations through 
which violence could be reproduced as repertoires and a problem of resources. Thus, 
violence  could be studied through inquiries that focus on: (1) questions of how vio-
lence creates new opportunities in institutionalizing movements and networks; (2) 
how violence is institutionalized; (3) the transferability of ideologies and violent dis-
courses across spatial and temporal boundaries; (4) the weakness of civil society; (5) 
the ambiguous role of the state; and (6) the precarious transformations that transpire 
when political orders are being contested.
It is against the background of durability that questions about the scale and 
transferability of violence emerges, which requires investigations of the steward-
ship of local culture, institution, and power. This issue, therefore, seeks to initiate a 
discussion of how violence operates on different scales through possible machinery. 
Violence in this context is not simply an outcome of tension but a mechanism that 
actors and organizations deploy to stabilize their struggles, which eventually makes 
peacebuilding or democratic projects volatile. 
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